Given a weakly o-minimal structure${\cal M}$and its o-minimal completion$\bar{{\cal M}}$, we first associate to$\bar{{\cal M}}$a canonical language and then prove thatTh$\left$determines$Th\left$. We then investigate the theory of the pair$\left$in the spirit of the theory of dense pairs of o-minimal structures, and prove, among other results, that it is near model complete, and every definable open subset of${\bar{M}^n}$is already definable in$\bar{{\cal M}}$.We give an example of a weakly o-minimal structure interpreting$\bar{{\cal M}}$and show that it is not elementarily equivalent to any reduct (...) of an o-minimal trace. (shrink)

Bibliography of A. A. Fraenkel (p. ix-x)--Axiomatic set theory. Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre, von P. Bernays.--On some problems involving inaccessible cardinals, by P. Erdös and A. Tarski.--Comparing the axioms of local and universal choice, by A. Lévy.--Frankel's addition to the axioms of Zermelo, by R. Mantague.--More on the axiom of extensionality, by D. Scott.--The problem of predicativity, by J. R. Shoenfield.--Mathematical logic. Grundgedanken einer typenfreien Logik, von W. Ackermann.--On the use of Hilbert's [epsilon]-operator in scientific theories, (...) by R. Carnap.--Basic verifiability in the combinatory theory of restricted generality, by H. B. Curry.--Uniqueness ordinals in constructive number classes, by H. Putnam.--On the construction of models, by A. Robinson.--Interpretation of mathematical theories in the first order predicate calculus, by T. Skolem.--The elementary character of two notions from general algebra, by R. Vaught.--Foundations of arithmetic and analysis. Axiomatic method and intuitionism, by A. Heyting.--On rank-decreasing functions, by G. Kurepa.--On non-standard models for number theory, by E. Mendelson.--Concerning the problem of axiomatizability of the field of real numbers in the weak second order logic, by A. Mostowski.--Non-standard models and independence of the induction axiom, by M. O. Rabin.--Sur les ensembles raréfiés de nombres naturels, par W. Sierpinski.--Philosophy of logic and mathematics. Remarks on the paradoxes of logic and set theory, by E. W. Beth.--Logique formalisée et raisonnement juridique, par R. Feys.--Im Umkreis der sogenannten Raumprobleme, von H. Freudenthal.--Process and existence in mathematics, by H. Wang. (shrink)

Articles chiefly on the life of some Buddhist philosophers, who were disciples of Gautama Buddha; includes critical essays on Buddhist literature.

[t. 1.] 1750-1830 -- [t. 2.] 1831-1864 -- [t. 3.] 1865-1895 -- [t. 4., zesz. 1.-2.] 1896-1918.

The language of science goes from description ton explanation; the first one is concerned in telling how phenomena happen and the second one to tell why they happen. This article explores two postures within science: the descriptive and the explanatory.

Neste artigo, Bar-Hillel e Carnap apresentam pela primeira vez as ideias básicas de uma teoria da informação semântica. O conceito de informação, baseado em sentença declarativa em uma dada linguagem, é definido pelo conteúdo descritivo expresso pelas sentenças. A quantidade de informação é calculada com base em um conjunto de funções lógicas probabilísticas sobre conjuntos de conteúdos descritíveis. Esta teoria tem aplicabilidade dedutiva e indutiva, significando um marco para o desenvolvimento das teorias filosóficas da informação.

Resumo Os sentidos para Frege são reais e objectivos, mas não são nem objectos nem funções. Eles são reais por causa da sua objectividade e por serem referências em contextos oblíquos. E, mesmo assim, eles não são objectos: eles não têm o modo de ser dos objectos – entidades identificáveis auto-subsistentes independentes – nem são funções. Assim, a ontologia de Frege inclui ainda uma outra categoria ontológica, a do sentido, que tem o seu próprio modo especial de ser. Entre as (...) suas características encontra-se: a sua intencionalidade, a sua sobreveniência na referência, a compreensibilidade pela mente humana e a limitação pela linguagem. Assim, os sentidos cruzam as distinções ontológicas simples, como a mental / material. Palavras-chave : Frege, funções, objectividade, objectos, platonismo, referência, sentidoFregean senses are real and objective, but neither objects nor functions. They are real because of their objectivity and their being references in oblique contexts. And yet they are not objects: they don’t have the mode of being of objects − independent self-subsistent identifiable entities − neither are they functions. Thus, Frege’s ontology includes another ontological category, that of sense, having its own special mode of being. Among its further characteristics are its intentionality, its supervenience on reference, its being graspable by the human mind and constrained by language. Thus, it crosses simple ontological distinctions like the mental / material one. Keywords : Frege, sense, reference, objects, function, objectivity, platonism. (shrink)

Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg Edited by James R. O'Shea and Eric M. Rubenstein Introduction KANT Willem deVries, Kant, Rosenberg, and the Mirror of Philosophy David Landy, The Premise That Even Hume Must Accept LANGUAGE AND MIND William G. Lycan, Rosenberg On Proper Names Douglas Long, Why Life is Necessary for Mind: The Significance of Animate Behavior Dorit Bar-On and Mitchell Green, Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning David Rosenthal, The Mind and Its Expression MIND AND (...) KNOWLEDGE Jeffrey Sicha, The Manifest Image: the Sensory and the Mental Bruce Aune, Rosenberg on Knowing Joseph C. Pitt, Sellarsian Antifoundationalism and Scientific Realism Matthew Chrisman, The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg James O’Shea, Conceptual Thinking and Nonconceptual Content: A Sellarsian Divide ONTOLOGY Anton Koch, Persons as Mirroring the World Eric M. Rubenstein, Form and Content, Substance and Stuff Ralf Stoecker, On Being a Realist About Death William G. Lycan, Biographical Remarks on Jay F. Rosenberg Scholarly Publications of Jay F. Rosenberg. (shrink)

It is widely believed that philosophical pessimism is committed to fatalism about the sufferings that characterize the human condition, and that it encourages resignation and withdrawal from the political realm in response. This paper offers an explanation for and argument against this perception by distinguishing two functions that pessimism can serve. Pessimism’s skeptical mode suggests that fundamental cross-cultural constraints on the human condition bar us from the good life (however defined). These constraints are often represented as immune to political amelioration, (...) leading to the perception that pessimism is intrinsically fatalistic and resigned. Yet pessimism’s critical function emphasizes the political, economic, and cultural contingency of many sources of suffering and crisis while exhorting us to reject and reimagine the social forces that actively harm our capacity to flourish. It also offers an internal critique of skeptical pessimism’s tendency to naturalize and depoliticize the sources of our sufferings. These sometimes contradictory skeptical and critical tendencies should both be grouped under the pessimist banner, and we should see pessimism’s critical mode as especially valuable to political critique. -/- . (shrink)

Recognizing that GLBTI individuals are often barred from visiting their partners in hospitals or from acting as health care surrogates for incapacitated partners, President Obama directed the Department of Health and Human Services to address these issues. In response, the department amended its rules to prohibit hospitals from restricting, limiting, or denying visitation privileges on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation. But the changes do not affect the designation of a health care surrogate, a matter largely governed by (...) state law. Therefore, subject to state law, same-sex partners can still be legally barred from making health care decisions for their incapacitated partners, and it remains essential that they execute advance directives and appoint one another as their health care proxies. (shrink)

This article compares and contrasts the patenting of animals, humans, and biotechnological inventions in the United States, at the European Patent Office, and within the European Union. It shows that morality is not a concern of U.S. legislative instruments or courts and patents have been granted liberally on living organisms, from microorganisms to mammals, in North America since the 1980s. By way of contrast, both European legislative instruments enshrine a morality bar that must be employed to deny patentability. Their implementation, (...) however, is unpredictable due to a lack of detailed guidance on what morality means. The remit of the morality bar extends principally to humans, but the interests of animals must now also be factored into the equation. The manner in which this is done is unclear and patents on plants, although controversial among the public in general, do not unduly trouble lawmakers now that a significant time has elapsed since this Rubicon was crossed. This article explains and critically assesses these systems while identifying some of the ethical problems that are likely to emerge in due course focusing on the ad hoc regard paid to animals and the lack of a structured approach to considering their rights or welfare. (shrink)

The difficulty of this little poem is shown by the facts that Ausonius had no idea what it was about, and that Westendorp Boerma's commentary takes 22 pages to explicate its five lines. The latter relies on Quintilian 8.3.27ff., who quotes the poem, saying that Vergil wrote it to attack a certain Cimber for his taste in obsolete words. This is no doubt the Annius Cimber whom Augustus ridiculed when reprimanding Mark Antony for a similar foible and who, as an (...) antiquarius is contrasted with the Asiatici oratores. For convenience, I have kept Westendorp Boerma's text, but I take issue with his interpretation on two points. 4 tau Gallicum: since Bücheler tentatively suggested it in RhM 38 , 508, the standard explanation of this has been to point out that a number of Latin inscriptions in Gaul use a Greek θ or else a barred D , to represent what appears to have been a dental fricative elsewhere indicated in Latin by -sd- or -st-. Thus Frank, AJP 56 , 255, quotes HYÐRITANVS for what is elsewhere spelled Thysdritanus, and says that ‘Ð clearly represents the best that one Celt could do with sd’. On the basis of this supposed Gallic incompetence, Frank went on to see the repeated -st- sounds in the poem as some sort of joke on the orator's inability to pronounce this sound. His view seems to have been generally accepted. There seems to me a profound error in this viewpoint which shows cultural imperialism at its worst. First, let us note that none of the examples of alleged substitution are in Latin words; they are native names for people or places or things. The Latin names by which we know some of them are only the approximation of foreigners, and not in any sense the ‘correct’ names of those people or places. (shrink)

Vaccine scarcity and availability distinguish two central ethics questions raised by the Covid-19 pandemic. First, in situations of scarcity, which groups of persons should receive priority? Second, in situations where safe and effective vaccines are available, what circumstances and reasons can support mandatory vaccination? Regarding the first question, normative approaches converge in prioritizing most-vulnerable groups. Though there is room for prudential judgement regarding which groups are most vulnerable, the human dignity principle is most relevant for prioritization consideration of both medical (...) and non-medical issues. The second question concerning mandates is distinct from considerations about persons’ individual moral duty to receive vaccines judged reasonably safe and critical for individual and public health. While there is consensus regarding the potential normative support for mandated vaccination, the paternalistic government intervention of vaccine mandates requires a high bar of demonstrated vaccine safety and public health risk. We discuss stronger and weaker forms of paternalism to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic from an “integrative” approach that integrates leading normative approaches. We argue against a population-wide compulsory vaccination and support prudential measures to 1) protect vulnerable groups; 2) focus upon incentivizing vaccine participation; 3) maintain maximum-possible individual freedoms, and 4) allow schools, organizations, and enterprises to implement vaccine requirements in local contexts. (shrink)

One criticism of revisionist just war thought is often called the “contingent pacifism” objection. According to this objection, revisionist just war theory fails because it requires combatants on the just side to evaluate the moral responsibility for wrongful harm of each combatant on the unjust side to determine liability to defensive harming in each case. Combatants on the just side are epistemically barred from making these determinations. Moreover, many combatants on the unjust side (e.g., cooks and administrative soldiers) fail to (...) meet the threshold of responsibility for wrongful harm to make them liable to lethal defensive harm. Therefore, ex hypothesi, combatants on the just side will inevitably target enemy combatants who are not liable to be killed. In this paper, I offer a novel response to the contingent pacifism objection. I argue that, even on the revisionist account, participation in a military engaged in an unjust war is sufficient for liability to lethal defensive harm. First, I show merely signaling a threat of unjust harm—even if one lacks the means to actualize the threat—is sufficient for liability to defensive harm. Second, I argue that almost all participants in military activity signal a threat. Finally, I conclude that, in general, combatants on the unjust side of a conflict signal threats of unjust harm and are therefore liable to lethal defensive harming. This novel account of signaling-as-threatening disarms the contingent pacifist objection. (shrink)

Most people think of preemption as a technical, constitutional doctrine, but it is pivotally important to health and safety and opens the door to broad judicial discretion. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ jurisprudence, with its support for both business and preemption, has been distinctly antiregulatory, invalidating major state public health rules in occupational safety, tobacco control, and motor vehicle safety, among other things.1 And apart from these antiregulatory stances, the Supreme Court has also been maddeningly inconsistent. Consider three relatively recent (...) cases. In its 2008 decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court held that federal law bars injured consumers from challenging the .. (shrink)

In the first of these two lectures Professor Hart is concerned with certain controversies and changes of attitude towards the question of moral guilt—mens rea,’ the guilty mind’—in criminal proceedings according to English law. There is, on the one hand and at one extreme, the attitude of the McNaughten Rules which excludes guilt only in the case of a ‘defect of reason’; at the other extreme there is the modern position, represented by Lady Wootton according to which the conception of (...) metis rea should be dropped altogether—criminal proceedings are concerned with ‘social hygiene’ and have nothing to do with responsibility: the question of responsibility comes up only after a verdict has been reached in estimating what steps are likely to have the best consequences for the ‘criminal’ and for society. Between these extremes Professor Hart takes a kind of middle course, what he calls ‘a moderate form of the new doctrine’: ‘Under this scheme mens rea would continue to be a necessary condition of liability to be investigated and settled before conviction except so far as it relates to mental abnormality. The innovation would be that the accused person would not be able to adduce any form of mental abnormality as a bar to conviction. The question of his mental abnormality would under this scheme be investigated only after conviction and would primarily be concerned with his present rather than his past mental state’. He admits that there are some practical difficulties against this view, but he does not consider the theoretical difficulty that the theory does away with the principle that criminal conviction must be based on guilt and responsibility. (shrink)

We show that particle-antiparticle exchange and covariant motion reversal are two physically different aspects of the same mathematical transformation, either in the prequantal relativistic equation of motion of a charged point particle, in the general scheme of second quantization, or in the spinning wave equations of Dirac and of Petiau-Duffin-Kemmer. While, classically, charge reversal and rest mass reversal are equivalent operations, in the wave mechanical case mass reversal must be supplemented by exchange of the two adjoint equations, implying ψ ⇄ (...) $\bar \psi$ .Denoting by M the rest mass reversal, P the parity reversal, T the Racah time reversal, and Z the ψ ⇄ $\bar \psi$ exchange, the connection with the usual scheme of charge conjugation, parity reversal, and Wigner motion reversal, is with, of course. (shrink)

High-spin states have been studied in Pr-135(59), populated through the Cd-116(Na-23,4n) reaction at 115 MeV, using the Gammasphere gamma-ray spectrometer. The negative-parity yrast band has been significantly extended to spin similar to 45 (h) over bar and excitation energy 21.5 MeV, showing evidence for several rotational alignments. The positive-parity yrast band of Ce-135(58), populated through the p4n channel of this reaction, was also populated to spin similar to 38 (h) over bar and excitation energy 18 MeV. Cranking calculations indicate that (...) these nuclei are soft with respect to the triaxiality parameter gamma and that several competing nuclear shapes occur at high spin. (shrink)

W. de Sitter, „On the relativity of inertia. Remarks concerning Einstein’s latest hypothesis”, Proceedings of the Section of Sciences. Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Vol. XIX, No. 9 i 10, Johannes Müller, Amsterdam, September 1917, pp. 1217–1225. Translated to Polish by Robert Janusz.

Neste artigo defendo que a Teoria da Informação Fortemente Semântica de Floridi – TIFS – está correta ao assumir a Tese da Veracidade, que por sua vez orienta a definição de informação semântica como “p é informação se e somente se p é constituído por dados bem-formados, com significado e verdadeiros”. Argumento que a teoria não é arbitrária, pois dá conta do desembaraço de conundrums filosóficos importantes, principalmente por evitar o paradoxo de Bar-Hillel e Carnap, que é gerado a partir (...) da teoria clássica da informação semântica. Primeiro é discutido um dos principais resultados da teoria clássica, o de produzir “sentenças muito informativas para serem verdadeiras”. Depois são resumidas as motivações para a elaboração de uma “lógica de estar informado” e é mostrado como o sistema KTB-IL é montado e modelado mantendo-se entre os seus axiomas o da veracidade – K ou A4. Finalmente, a TIFS é examinada e defendida ao mostrar que ela restringe aleticamente a extensão do conceito clássico de informação para evitar problemas com tautologias e contradições. A TIFS oferece uma solução original ao capturar nossas intuições modais a respeito da informatividade como noção básica. (shrink)